Admiral Fiske in his exposition of the effectiveness of skill* demonstrates that its importance increases in large increments in passing from the management of the battleship to that of the division, to that of the squadron, to that of the fleet, to the management of the navy.
Few people will question the logic of this demonstration, and yet in practice the premium placed on professional skill seems to be somewhat greater on board the battleship than is the case in the Navy Department. This condition is not a recent development, and the present administration has done much to improve it. But notwithstanding recent reforms, there is still evidence of lack of skill in the operation of Navy Department machinery. In the absence of a naval war staff it would appear merely a question of arrangement whether a definite plan for organization and training for war should be drawn by the Secretary and his aids, by the General Board, or by the Commander-in-Chief. The important point is that naval work should proceed in accordance with a good plan. Lack of this essential would indicate violation of the principle of skill.
On board individual ships, on the other hand, a definite plan for war preparation is followed, and experts on so-called efficiency methods " have praised' ship organization and administration. Perhaps the most potent factor making for this naval efficiency is the well-defined chain of responsibility leading from the captain down to the recruit fresh from the training station. The captain is personally responsible for his ship, and is held strictly to account if he fails to keep the ship and crew prepared for service. Naturally, the captain in turn holds the officers under him strictly responsible for the proper performance of their respective duties; and the officers hold the men responsible, thus completing the chain. This keen sense of personal responsibility makes for efficiency in more ways than one, and perhaps the most valuable way is the subtle influence it exerts in causing officers to gravitate to the billets they are personally best qualified to fill. Thus the officer well qualified to be ordnance officer is usually so billeted, while perhaps a classmate whose inclination is toward engineering work is detailed to the Engineer's Department. Divisional officers best qualified for turret work command turrets, and the experienced spotter and fire-control officer finds himself in the fire-control division. "Efficiency " from top to bottom is the watchword, and there is very little room for " special privilege."
This secret of battleship efficiency simply bears out the ancient principle that in handling complex and difficult machinery requiring special and divers kinds of skill, both in management and operation, it is of first importance that responsibility be clearly defined and that methods be adopted which aim at getting the right man in the right place. A reflex consequence of this principle in practice is added incentive for individuals to train themselves to increase their skill.
Although the application of this principle is not so apparent in the interior workings of the Navy Department, still, as has already been remarked, noteworthy efforts have been made to better the central managing system. For instance, the establishment of an admiralty board or navy general staff, similar to those of foreign navies, is generally conceded as desirable, and the recent creation of the office of Chief of Naval Operations is manifestly a step in that direction. The general idea of Navy Department organization outlined by Lieutenant Allen (page 863) seems to be in accord with principles the soundness of which has withstood trial in various managements, both civil and military. Improvement in the Navy Department machinery is progressing. The important preliminary steps have already been taken and, before long, the initiators of these steps will probably hit upon a satisfactory solution.
It is, however, with skill in administration that this paper has to do and not with the mechanical organization of the department. To prevent confusion of thought in following this distinction it is well, even at the risk of reiterating obvious and well-known truths, to point out that there are two factors which make for success—one is good machinery and the other is skillful operation. These two factors are so interdependent in practice that careful analysis is often necessary to guard against drawing wrong inferences as to cause and effect. For example, let us consider two types of turrets, one fitted for mechanical loading and the other for hand loading. On trial the hand loading turret does the better. This may be due to better machinery, to more skillful operation, to both combined, or to much more skillful operation with inferior machinery. Snap judgment often considers only the first of these contingencies that is to say, failure to get good results is attributed to poor machinery, when, in reality, it is due more to lack of skill in operation. Another reason for confusion may be found in the fact that delicate machinery is frequently ruined if badly handled. It is well known that an unskillful workman usually blames his tools for unsatisfactory results. Then, if examination reveals that his tools are dull, it may be that they were in this condition to start with and his complaints therefore justified, or it may be that his blunderings have blunted their edge.
As satisfactory conclusions would probably never be arrived at it would profit little to try to determine whether failure to have naval work proceed in accordance with a good plan is due to poor machinery, or to lack of skill, or to both. But in facing this condition, it is well worth while to reflect upon these two interdependent factors, and to strive not only for improvement in the machinery, but also for increased skill in its operation.
In seeking practical methods for placing a higher premium on skill in the Navy Department, it would appear necessary to advance slowly by the process of experiment and improvement. The following suggestions, therefore, are offered tentatively, more with a view to elaborating a general idea than to proposing a definite scheme. In attempting this elaboration, moreover, it is borne in mind that the safest ground to start out on is that which has already been tested by experience.
In the industrial world it has been found, in filling positions calling for special kinds of skill, that a man does best at the work in which he takes most interest and that in fitting the right man in the right position much reliance can be placed on the applicant's estimate of his own ability. Honesty and accuracy are the rule and not the exception. One reason for this is that full references are required, which, if looked up and compared with the applicant's statement, would very likely reveal any glaring errors in his self-estimate. Another reason for careful truthfulness on the part of the applicant is that it would avail 'him little to overestimate his abilities, because actual trial would sooner or later discover the true measure of his skill, and, if short of his estimate would result in a loss of both position and. reputation. It is therefore suggested that in seeking special skill in the Navy Department considerable weight can be given to the estimate which each officer makes of his own abilities.
Examinations are another means of determining a man's knowledge and abilities. This method has received wide, and various application and is so well known that little need be said about it here, save perhaps to point out that its success depends largely upon the character of the abilities to be determined and however sound examinations may appear in theory, they have been found in practice frequently unsatisfactory and sometimes even misleading. It is safe to assume that, in an attempt to get skill, examinations would be useful only to a very limited extent. Examinations measure knowledge more than they do skill.
Much attention has been given recently to preparing the individual records of naval officers and developing a system by which the information to be derived therefrom may be accessible in convenient form. These records should supply valuable help in applying the principle of skill, but there are pit-falls to guard against, and it would appear a simple matter to draw wrong inferences. There is necessarily lack of Uniformity in standards for marking, and while these records supply a useful guide, they should generally be taken with mental reservation.
Professional reputation gives still another means of determining whether or not a man is suitable for a particular position. Were it possible to take a true measure of this desideratum much confidence could be placed therein. But here again the pit-falls are obvious. The sources of information would have to be submitted to searching scrutiny and would also have to be wide in range, or injustice might easily be done.
An apposite example of the successful application of the principle aiming at getting the right man in the right place is seen in the way the army fills vacancies existing in their Ordnance Department. This method is described in a last year's issue of the Army and Navy Journal as follows:
Examinations were held at various places on January 26 of officers desiring to be detailed to fill vacancies existing in the Ordnance Department on June 20 next. The details, will be made upon recommendation of a board of ordnance officers convened as soon as practicable after the receipt of the examination, papers. Officers that already have served in the Ordnance Department and will have had at least a year's service with their commands by June 20 also will be eligible to detail, but they will not be required to take the examination. They are authorized to apply to the 'adjutant general of the army for detail, calling attention to any matters of record that they desire to have considered by the board convened for the purpose of making recommendations for selection.
Though not specifically stated, it may be inferred that, speaking broadly, the recommendations made by the above-mentioned board of ordnance officers were based on statements made by the applicants themselves, on examinations, on official records, and on professional reputation.
It may be reasoned that somewhat similar methods might be used to advantage in the navy, not only in filling vacancies in the Ordnance Department and Gun Factory, but also in the Judge Advocate General's Office, Office of Naval Intelligence, naval attache assignments, and the high executive positions wherein it is so important to get special skill.
NOTE.-It might be feasible to have a naval board on details composed of two parts. The standing part to consist of, say, three officers in the Bureau of Navigation and the variable part to consist of two officers on duty in the bureau or office appropriate to the particular vacancies respecting which recommendations for detail were to be made. For example, if vacancies calling for engineering work were under consideration, then the variable part of the board would comprise two officers on duty in the Bureau of Steam Engineering.
Of course, nothing original is claimed in this brief discussion of a very old subject, nor is it intended to imply that the principle of skill is disregarded in making assignments by methods now in use. On the contrary, it has been pointed out that recent improvements have been made and that important steps toward better management are now in progress. But in spite of this and because so little is known of the way the navy is managed, the feeling, whether justified or not; is prevalent throughout the service that the Navy Department is not as free from the evil influences of special privilege as it might be. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that any open steps taken to increase the premium placed on skill in the central plant, to which all should look for precept and example, would increase the general content, promote cheerful cooperation, and supply an additional incentive—in the words of Admiral Fiske—"To train strenuously to increase our skill."