FROM FEBRUARY 23 TO MARCH 23
GERMANY AND THE ALLIED POWERS
Foch on German Armament.—On March 3 Marshal Foch as chairman of the Interallied Military Commission presented to the Conference of Ambassadors an interpretation of the long report of the special commission on German armament. Marshal Foch did not enter into technical details, but pointed out that the German Reichwehr consisted entirely of former commissioned and non-commissioned officers, who are being trained to command troops and would furnish a framework for an army of 500,000 or 600,000; that the “Green Police” were in effect a military organization and that there were many secret semi-military societies in Germany; and that the German general staff consisted of 250 officers, or only sixty less than for the Kaiser’s pre-war army. Marshal Foch’s aim was to show that mere insistence on technical fulfilment of treaty terms would gain little, and that the security of France and her former allies must be provided for by other means. The Conference, however, called for specific technical recommendations, thus reflecting the British policy of keeping the question of treaty fulfilment separate from the larger security issue. The only technical requirement to which the French are now said to attach much importance is the neutralized Rhine frontier.
British Reject Geneva Protocol.—At the session of the League of Nations Council at Geneva beginning March 9 the British Foreign Minister, Austen Chamberlain, made an extended statement setting forth his government’s reasons for declining to ratify the Geneva Peace Protocol, and for preferring instead a system of mutual guarantees among groups of nations. At bottom the British objection appeared to be based on unwillingness to accept arbitration of all international issues, preferring, like the United States, to reserve the right to say what issues are or are not justiciable. The Canadian representative in a separate statement supported the British position, citing among other objections the effect of non-participation by the United States upon attempts to enforce sanctions. In proposing mutual guarantee treaties among groups of nations as a substitute for the protocol, the Baldwin government returned to the plan of military alliances rejected by the Labor Government eight months ago.
The Council adopted a resolution sending the protocol back to the Assembly, and leaving little prospect of immediate solution of the security problem. In the discussion in the Council, the smaller nations, whose chief spokesman was Foreign Minister Benes of Czecho-Slovakia, strongly supported the protocol, which appeared to them the only effective means of assuring a peaceful settlement of the many problems of central Europe.
Sees Hope in British Proposals.—From The New York Times, 14 March, 1925.—Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia, co-author of the American proposal which formed the basis of the Geneva protocol to end war, declared today in commenting on Austen Chamberlain’s attack yesterday on the protocol:
“The British Government rejects the protocol of last September but, at the same time, it offers suggestions of a line of policy which would make possible some sort of substitute for the plans of the League. In the first news items it was natural that the negative aspect of this action should receive most emphasis, but it is the positive side of the actual British proposals which really demands our attention most.
“The first question is whether the British proposals are simply vague phrases intended to soften the blow to the feelings of France and those nations which supported the proctocol. In that case there would be nothing left but the polite camouflage of diplomacy. The total effect of the action of Britain would simply be a return to the old balance of power theory with the inevitable race in armaments and the almost equally inevitable catastrophe at the close.
“It is inconceivable that this cynical interpretation should stand. There is no reason to question the sincerity of the positive proposal any more than the motives which underlay the formation of the proctocol itself. Great Britain has not spoken at Geneva with the repressive and disheartening message of unregenerate militarism, but with a desire to contribute toward a different method of solution than that pursued in the formation of the protocol.
“Britain proposes, in substance, that there should be a development of pacts of non-aggression between potential enemies, agreements of limited extent and obligation by which specific differences shall be settled peaceably and both parties to these pacts agree upon some workable measures for limiting their armaments. There is in this plan the elements of an enlarged adaptation and, therefore, a justification of the Washington conference method."
Renewed Talk of Naval Conference.—With the rejection of the Geneva protocol and abandonment of a general disarmament conference under the League, attention was again directed to the possibilities of such a conference under American auspices. President Coolidge had indicated his intention, in case of failure of the League plans, to sound the powers who participated in the Washington Conference as to their attitude regarding a second meeting. It was made clear in Washington that at this second conference only discussion of naval reduction was contemplated.
THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY
Franco-British Negotiations.—A Paris dispatch of March 21 stated that the British government, in discussing a security agreement with France, insisted that the inclusion of Germany should be considered. The British position was that Germany should be given an opportunity to state the terms upon which she would enter such a pact. If the objections in the way of Franco-British agreement should be removed, a conference of the four powers—France, Belgium, Great Britain and Germany—might be held in the coming summer.
Edwin L. James in New York Times, March 6.—An eloquent commentary on the complexity of European affairs is that with France desiring English protection against Germany and with England’s Government ready in principle to give that, the matter cannot be dealt with expeditiously. France wishes to have the English guarantee and at the same time keep her alliances on the Continent. In that the English see grave danger of committing themselves too far. England is willing to promise to protect France against a German invasion in order to protect the Channel ports, but at the same time Downing Street has other auxiliary motives. In a three-cornered treaty of England, France and Germany, England would always be the deciding factor between France and Germany, or at least that is the calculation apparently made. At the same time England wishes to keep Germany and Russia separate, and therefore listens attentively to a German proposal to come in, only biding her time to impose as a condition the tearing up of the Rapallo Treaty between Berlin and Moscow.
There is no doubt some British statesmen would shed no tears over the end of France’s system of alliances on the Continent. But having spent four years, much effort and money on building up her system, having hard and fast formal alliances, the French are not yet ready to drop all that for a security treaty bearing Germany’s signature.
The situation is about as complicated as it could be, and no one just now knows the answer. The French have probably got a hard decision to make, and certainly the mind of Paris is not made up. In the circumstances, England holds the center of the stage. It will be when England offers France her promise of protection in a security pact including Germany that the French attitude will be all important. Nationalist France is dead against the German proposal. The Left is by no means unanimous for it.
Opposed to a League of Europe.—Rome, March 21.—Signor Schanzer, former Italian Foreign Minister, who has had a prominent part in League of Nations affairs, has contributed a leading article to the Giornale D’ltalia, arguing against the formation of “a United States of Europe in a super-governmental sense.”
The article was written because of the discussion which has been aroused over the plan for regional pacts, introduced by Dr. Benes, Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, at the recent session of the League of Nations Council.
Signor Schanzer declares that such unions as suggested by Dr. Benes are likely to stimulate a pan-Oriental movement, signs of which, he asserts, are appearing in the rapprochements between Japan, China and Russia. They would also tend to orientate the British Empire and American power, thus, in the opinion of Signor Schanzer, ultimately developing a balance of power system over the whole world, similar to but many times greater than that which existed before the war.
“Therefore,” Signor Schanzer says, “it would be fraught with much more deadly consequences.”
The best plan, Signor Schanzer believes, would be to have a security and peace pact among the leading European nations, including Germany, into which other nations might enter whenever they chose.
GERMANY
Germany Invited to Enter League.—In a private session the League Council on March 10 rejected German’s conditions regarding entrance into the League of Nations. The Council, however, decided that a reply should be sent to Germany which, while refusing to exempt her from military duties called for by the Covenant, should express a cordial desire for German’s entrance into the League, and give assurance that Germany would be accorded a seat on the League Council, as evidently intended in the Covenant.
Election of President to Succeed Ebert.—President Ebert of Germany died of peritonitis at the end of February and was buried at Heidelberg on March 5. The German constitution provides that in the election of president a candidate to be elected must receive more than half of the total vote cast; if no candidate receives such a majority, a second election is held, in which the candidate who receives the most votes, whether or not an absolute majority, is elected. The dates of these two elections were set for March 29, and April 26. Counting on no decision in the first election, most of the German parties put candidates in the field. The nominees were as follows: Extreme Nationalists, General Ludendorff; Bavarian People’s Party, former Bavarian Premier Held; Nationalists and People’s Party,
Dr. Karl Jarres; Center, ex-Chancellor Marx; Democrats, Professor Hellpach; Socialists, Otto Braun; Communists, Ernst Thaelmann. It was anticipated that Jarres and Braun would take first and second place in the preliminary voting.
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
Isle of Pines to Cuba.—The Isle of Pines Treaty with Cuba, negotiated by John Hay in 1904, was ratified by the United States Senate on March 13, 1925. The treaty relinquishes any United States claim to the island that might be raised under Articles 1 and 2 of the Peace Treaty between the United States and Spain. At the same time the Senate decided to defer action on the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey and the question of becoming a member of the World Court until the regular session of Congress in December.
Tacna-Arica Settlement.—On March 9 President Coolidge submitted his decision as arbitrator in the dispute between Chili and Peru over the provinces of Tacna and Arica, taken from Chile by Peru in 1883. The decision provides: (1) that a plebiscite shall be held; (2) that the date and rules of the plebiscite shall be determined by a commission of three representing Chili, Peru, and the United States, which must meet within six months from the date of the decision; (3) that those allowed to vote shall be all males over twenty-one born in the provinces or resident two years prior to registration, with the exception of civil and military officials not born in the provinces. The northern boundary of the district in dispute was decided in favor of Peru, and the southern boundary was submitted to a special commission. The decision, though not fully meeting the claims of either party, was more favorably received in Chili than in Peru.