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Marines kept to themselves on board steel Navy warships where they were often made to feel as welcome as rats in the mess hall. One naval officer, speaking for many, wrote, “I have never found them [the marines] as valuable as the space required for them.”
With the coming of age of the all-steam Navy in the late 19th century came the require' ment for advanced bases in potential theaters of operation to maintain coal piles and support facilities for the fleet. By the mid-1880s, farsighted Navy and Marine Corps officers saw the need for such bases and an armed force to defend them, but they were divided in their opinions as to who should provide the defense. Most naval officers thought the defense force should come from the crew, a carryover from the ship’s landing party. In 1888, Navy Lieutenant Dennis H. Mahan published an article
^Marines
By Lieutenant Colonel John J. Reber, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
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ln the Proceedings in which he recommended that ship’s crews be organized into 63-man infantry companies.1 He advocated a well-organized and trained naval infantry in contrast to the hastily organized ship’s landing party that usually landed against poorly armed natives to show the flag.
For the next six years, the article was the center of considerable controversy. Navy Lieutenant William F. Fullam led the opposition—he thought that ‘nfantry tactics belonged to the Army and not the Navy. Fullamites believed that the crews could not he spared from their shipboard duties to act as naval
infantry. They also believed that organizing infantry companies from the ship’s crews exaggerated the problem. Fullam said, “. . . mob and street fighting ... is that which naval battalions are most likely to perform. . . . We talk a great deal in the Navy about skirmishes and battles, but history shows more cases of landing for service in the streets of cities.” He wanted the Navy to retain the landing party role, but he did not foresee the landing party fighting in large-scale battles as Mahan envisioned; therefore, large landing parties were not needed. Fullam also did not want marines on board ship, believing that the Marines’ shipboard role ended with the Navy’s transition from sail to steam. The marines wanted to remain on board ship, since they saw themselves as the best suited to spearhead a landing party. They also feared the Corps’ demise if it was separated from the Navy.
Fullam argued that there would be no more fighting at close quarters as in the past with sailing ships when marines were used as sharpshooters high in the fighting tops to pick off enemy officers. In an 1890 Proceedings article, he said that using marines to enforce shipboard discipline degraded Navy petty officers, resulting in low morale.2
In 1889, the Bureau of Navigation, then the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Navy for operational matters, stepped into the controversy and appointed the Greer Board of Organization, Tactics, and Drills. The board recommended doing away with Mahan’s proposal to organize infantry companies from ship’s crews. The board further recommended that the Marines be assigned the fleet infantry role, but that they be removed from all ships and moved ashore to be regimented for use in large- scale landings. Setting the marines ashore, the board reasoned, would satisfy the Fullam faction. But it did not satisfy them because they also wanted to retain the landing party role. Likewise, the Marines were not satisfied with the idea of being regimented ashore because they wanted to retain close ties with the Navy and remain on board ship.
The controversy was ended by the 1894 congressional decision to retain marines on board ship and assign the fleet infantry role to them. The 1894 statement of Navy Captain Henry C. Taylor, then-president of the Naval War College, regarding the crew providing the landing party had considerable influence on the congressional decision. Taylor said that if the landing mission were handled by seamen, “I do not doubt that those seamen, and officers who command them, would evolve . . . into a new Corps identical with ... the present marines.”3
The decision was most important to the evolution of the fleet Marines as an integral part of the fleet. If the Marines had been set ashore in accordance with the Greer Board’s recommendation, the Corps probably would have been absorbed by the Army as a coast artillery corps similar to several European marine corps, and present amphibious forces would consist of a joint Army-Navy force, with all of its inherent problems, rather than the more effective and efficient integrated Navy-Marine Corps amphibious force.
Fullam resigned himself to the Marines in the fleet infantry role, but proposed that they have their own transports.4 He reasoned that the ship’s captain would be a naval officer and would command all naval units on board, including the Marines and their training and operations ashore.5
Most naval officers agreed with Fullam that Marines should be removed from warships. Navy Lieutenant Commander W. J. Barnette summed up the feelings of many naval officers when he said, • I
have never found them [the marines] as valuable as the space required for them. In a ship of the Maine class, where there is room and to spare, the marines can be endured. . . .” But the last part of his statement is most prophetic, ”... I fail to understand the objections of the marines to being assigned exclusively to shore duty. . . . The time is coming- and very shortly, when, in addition to their present very important shore duties, they will be required to guard outlying coal stations.”6
During the Spanish-American War, Marine Lieutenant Colonel R. W. Huntington’s successful seizure of Guantanamo Bay for an advanced base saved the day for Commodore W. T. Sampson’s blockading fleet 40 miles away at Santiago de Cuba and set a precedent as to who should provide the advanced base force. On 6 October 1900, the General Board of the Navy recommended to the Secretary of the Navy, John Davis Long, that the Marines would be best adapted for immediate call-up to defend an advanced base. The board considered using the Army, but said:
“. . . in the opinion of the General Board the requirements of the naval establishment of the United States include a military organization of sufficient strength in numbers and efficiency, to enable the Navy to meet all demands upon it for service within its own sphere of operations without dependence upon the cooperation of the Army for troops and military supplies, for such a force of the Army may not always be available.”7 The question of command relationship was a major reason the board rejected the Army as the advanced base force.
The board also recommended that the Marine Corps organize a permanent battalion of four 104-man companies. This recommendation for the Marine Corps to organize, train, and equip a unit to accomplish a specific task was the first of its kind. Until this time, marines were transferred from detachments at naval shore installations to form an expeditionary unit and returned to their home stations after their mission had been accomplished. There were no permanently organized expeditionary units.
. Men were transferred from naval shore installa- t'ons to form companies at Newport, Rhode Island, ar>d Annapolis, Maryland, for the advanced base battalion. In 1901, an advanced base detachment of ave officers and 40 men was established at Newport. While the enlisted marines conducted practical gaining, the officers drew up a plan from the Span- jsh-American War experience for the defense of Cu- *ebra, a small island off the east coast of Puerto Rico, ^hich naval strategists considered a likely advanced base. They tested their plans with small-scale excises at Newport and Nantucket. The battalion sailed for Culebra on 5 November in the USS Prairie and conducted defensive exercises during the winter °f 1902-03. It was generally agreed that the marines a good job of defending the advanced base.
Though the advanced base battalion was to be a Permanent organization, it was impossible to maintain the battalion and carry out President Theodore Roosevelt’s “big stick” policy in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Panama. The advanced base detachment at Viewport was disbanded, and in 1904 the advanced base battalion went to Panama. This was the fate of all “permanent” advanced base units until 1933 when the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) was established as an integral part of the fleet.
In 1910, the Secretary of the Navy, George von b-engerke Meyer, charged the Navy Division of Inspections with inspecting the advanced base mate- J?al and training. Now a captain, Fullam was Aide Inspections and jumped at the chance to inspect lne marines. He reported that the advanced base 0rganization and its operations were a failure, only accomplishing some minor work at Culebra and Su- b'c Bay. He further stated that there had been no Practical instruction in advanced base operations, ®nly academic instruction for a few officers at the Naval War College and the Advanced Base School. 1° July 1910, the Marine Corps Commandant, Major General George F. Elliott, established an Advanced Rase School at New London, Connecticut, but the location was not entirely satisfactory, so it was moved t0 Philadelphia in 1911.
While on the Naval War College staff in 1912, Marine Captain “Pete” Ellis proposed seizing bases. Until then, it was assumed that the United States '''ould either own or lease bases. He said that if the state does not control the territory for a base, then Ibe port must be leased. “If this is impossible," he said, “preparations should he made to secure it at the outbreak of war" and “. . . there must be carried with the floating base or train a military force Qdeqaate to seize and secure the port. . . . For this work the Advanced Base Outfit is primarily intended.”8 (Emphasis added.) Ellis advocated carrying with the fleet a military force (to become the
u. S. NAVAL ACADEMY
This young naval officer with the imperious bearing fought hard to eliminate the Marine Corps, especially from ships. To William Fullam’s chagrin, he ended up helping them more than he hurt them. Not only did they keep their shipboard role, but his criticisms goaded them into developing the advanced base force.
FMF) adequate to seize a base. The advanced base force’s mission when it was created by the General Board in 1900 was to defend—not to seize—an advanced base. It would be ten years before Ellis’s concept would have a significant following. Ellis was also ahead of his time when he said, “The advanced base force is as much an element of fleet strength as any type man-of-war. . . .”9 It would be 1933 before the FMF became a fleet type command.
In 1913, the General Board recommended to Meyer that an advanced base force consist of a Marine brigade of two 1,250-man regiments: a fixed defense regiment, primarily coast artillery, to defend the base
unsatisfactory is an understatement. The fact that so many things did go wrong was the most important lesson learned from such a large-scale exercise.
Marine aviators Captain James T. Moore and Lieutenant Hayne D. Boyden bombed ships of the fleet from their DH-4Bs with improvised bombs— rolls of toilet paper.
All Flexes until 1925 were executed by East Coast units. In April 1925, a joint Army-Navy fleet exercise was conducted in Hawaii. The 4th Regiment from San Diego supplied the bulk of the assault force. The defense force consisted of army and navy units based in Hawaii. Army Major General John Leonard Hines, who commanded the defense force, said, “. . . no doubt that highly-trained well-led infantry can establish a beachhead once the troops are ashore— but getting ashore, there’s the rub.”" Ironing out that rub became the Marine Corps’ main task before World War II. Getting ashore was the essence of amphibious warfare.
Marines were in Nicaragua between 1926 and 1933, which, along with the Great Depression, kept the Corps from participating in Flexes. With a limited budget and fewer marines, emphasis was placed on revising and improving the curriculum of the Marine Corps School (MCS) at Quantico. The MCS was Army-oriented because of the recent experience in World War I, and because many senior Marine officers, including Commandant Lejeune, had attended the Army War College or the Staff College of the Army.
In 1927, the Joint Board of the Army and Navy recognized the Marine Corps’ history, experience, and training in landing operations and assigned the Corps the responsibility “to provide and maintain forces for operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.’’12 With that, the Marine Corps had the responsibility of developing and teaching doctrine of landing a force in an assault of defended beaches. The academic year 1927-28 saw a complete revision and expansion of the MCS and tripled the emphasis on landing operations—“getting ashore” had become a priority subject. By 1939, 42% of the instruction pertained to some aspect of landing operations.
Several Marine Corps officers, but most notably Major General John H. Russell, believed that a Marine base force must be placed in the operating forces of the fleet as a type command. Otherwise, as in the past, training in advanced base or expeditionary work would be continually interrupted by the detachment of one unit after another for “banana wars,” or for guarding naval shore installations. Also, they were convinced that the advanced base force, or landing force, in any overseas naval operation required the Navy’s active participation. The Navy should procure for the Marines such things as transports, cargo ships, landing craft, and more rugged and waterproof equipment. It should also develop the special type of ship and aerial bombardment of shore installations required until the marines were established ashore with their own fire support. Procedures for the direct support of troops ashore by naval gunfire would have to be worked out. Combat
loading techniques and control of off-loading ships 'J'ould have to be developed, along with many other Navy-type responsibilities. It was the Marine Corps’ Mission to support the fleet, but it was also the Navy s mission to support the landing force.
In August 1933, General Russell, then-Assistant to the Commandant, suggested discontinuing the old e*peditionary force and creating a new force to be ’ called either the Fleet Base Defense Force or the meet Marine Force and making it an integral part °I Ihe fleet. After approval by the Commandant and me appropriate bureaus of the Navy Department, ^ecretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson signed general Order No. 241 on 7 December 1933, establishing the FMF as a “force of Marines maintained by the Major General Commandant in a state of readiness for operation with the fleet.”13
Creating the FMF was not enough. A basic doc- Irine was needed to guide the training of the FMF ^n(I the fleet elements which would operate with it. Cn 14 November 1933, classes were discontinued ^ MCS, and staff and students began work on a landing manual. The original manual. Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, was in mimeo- |raph format and was used at MCS during the 1934- ■p school year; it was not distributed outside of the MCS. Later manual boards at Quantico revised the bjanual. In 1938, the manual was issued as Fleet yaining Publication (FTP) #167, also known as the tending Operations Doctrine, U. S. Navy 1938. Ihis edition, with changes, was the guide for the Cuadalcanal landings in August 1942. World War II began with a shaky amphibious doctrine, but re- bnements over the years have resulted in the present doctrine, which has been tested in combat.
. Training for landing operations was not to be found *n classrooms and manuals alone. It was necessary 1° exercise the doctrine in Flexes. There were seven between 1935 and 1941 at Culebra and Vieques Is- ar*ds off the east coast of Puerto Rico, at the southern coast of Puerto Rico, and at San Clemente Island °ff San Diego. Many of the landing problems were forked out in these Flexes, and changes in equipment made. The latter ranged from doing away with canvas leggings to designing attack transports. In 1^36, in place of the old-style gangways, cargo nets ^ere hung over the side to get troops off the ships more rapidly. During the Flexes, marines pleaded lor modern attack aircraft, but they had to wait until World War II for good close-support aircraft. The helicopter came into its own during the Korean con- met; since then, it has played an increasingly important role. Since World War II, there have been further refinements: Better amphibious ships and Ending craft have been developed; sophisticated air jmd naval gunfire control and coordination systems have evolved; new logistical concepts, such as prePositioning of material, including the near-term pre-
positioning ships (NTPS), helped solve logistics problems; electronic developments such as integrated circuits and other solid state devices and miniaturized components have revolutionized weaponry and communications.
The fleet Marines have had many mission, role, and name changes since that first advanced base battalion was established in 1900. They have evolved into an all-purpose air-ground team, unique in the world of military forces, a mobile force of combined arms, specializing in amphibious warfare, tied closely to the Navy by integrated doctrine, training, and operations. Its roles range from providing combat units for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to amphibious units for the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf, or anywhere else in the world where the United States has contingency responsibilities.
Marine Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak put it best when he said, “The Marines don’t have a role except to be malleable enough to do what comes on the horizon.”141 Lt. D. H. Mahan, USN, "Three Considered As A Tactical Unit." Proceedings. Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1888, pp. 343-393.
:Lt. William F. Fullam, USN, "The System of Naval Training And Discipline Required To Promote Efficiency And Attract Americans," Proceedings, Vol. XVI, No. 4, 1890, pp. 473-536.
'W. H. Russell, "The Genesis of FMF Doctrine: 1789-1899," Murine Corps Gazelle, April 1951, p. 56.
4Lt. W. F. Fullam, USN, "The Organization, Training, And Discipline Of The Navy As Viewed From The Ship," Proceedings. Vol. XXII, No. 1, 1896, pp. 83-116.
’Only the sharpest resistance prevented Fullam from controlling the advanced base force. Although he practically made a career of being the Marine Corps' nemesis, he was pointing the way to the future when the Navy would have attack transports, helicopter assault ships, and other amphibious ships for the Marines. But the ship's captain would not, as Fullam proposed, command the Marines' training and operations ashore.
Although Fullam is usually pictured by Marine Corps historians as the Corps' enemy, he did much to improve both the Marine Corps and the Navy. Many senior Marine Corps officers had to be prodded to develop the advanced base force, which they did not see as a major role for the Corps. Fullam did most of the prodding.
''Fullam, Op. Cit.. 1896, pp. 124-25.
’Admiral George Dewey's letter to SecNav, I November 1900.
*Capt. Earl H. Ellis, USMC, Naval Bases, p. 4. Available at the Naval War College.
l'Capt. Earl H. Ellis, USMC, The Advanced Base Force, p. 6. Available at the Naval War College.
l0Capt. W. S. Sims, USN, report to CinCLantFIt, 23 January 1914.
"K. W. Condit and E. T. Turnbladh, Hold High The Torch, A History of the 4tlt Marines (Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1960.)
12U. S. Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, (Washington, 1927). p. 3.
"M.Gen. J. H. Russell. USMC, "The Birth of the FMF," Proceedings, January 1946, pp. 49-51.
I4J. R. Moskin, The U. S. Marine Corps Story (New York: McGraw Hill, 1955), p. 920.
Colonel Reber enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1936. During World War 11. he participated in the Bougainville. Guam, Peleliu, Emi- rau, and Okinawa operations. In Korea, he served with the I Ith Marines. He was then an instructor. Senior Amphibious Warfare School. From 1957 to 1961, he served on the staff of CG FMFPac, CinCPacFlt, and CTF-79. Before retiring in 1968, he was executive officer of the Communications-Electronics Schools, Battalion, MCRD, San Diego,CA., 1964-68.