This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
T
of a ^y ^ea: The Development p0j>erican Coastal Defense
Gregn S' Bro",ning III. Westport:
Sj "Wood Press, 1983. 210 pp. Bib. *nd.
95 ($26.95).
'Cvved by E. Raymond Lewis
A .
Mil,- encan author and journalist Walter natj'S,0nce observed that several of this su^11 s seaports exhibit a “kind of re- ^American military architecture.” pertTlas n°ting, among other things, that aid h m fortifications constructed in l"0ch ^^n'ted States were pretty contr- *'m'tec* t0 seacoast defenses, in Pr0, Ust to European practice, where such inia =tl0n was commonly provided for cities-
iJliCj s might have noted also that these <*** as perhaps the foremost mon- Vhjj s to a defense philosophy that, ",as(-not uniclue t0 the United States, isticafnd’ ar8uablY’ stiH is) so character- 1° be° American defense orientation as ti°nai 1Actively ingrained within its nataliy • Protective impulse. Fundamen- defe’ 11 ,'s the belief that the American siiCceSe 'deal can be ensured through the %eSSf ul discouragement of all potential eifortSS°rs’ Provided that enough money, tig!,, ar|d faith are channeled into the lnds of hardware. This is the es- 9s reof deterrence in a defense context; ***** as the Vietnam War, this ap- M. q, was described by General James agiaav,n as operating on “the theory of M0 armadillo.”
,rariS| Crc was this concept so directly j®d into tangibility, in so pure and
Ports_ °rward a form, as in our seacoast
Va‘ranslation particularly dominant Set *de 19th century. By the end of San ?tUrY’ a leading contemporary his- ?Sisas °hserved, the American em- virtu-(|[l td's i(,rm °P defense had grown a iy into an obsession (and] almost Pr>ljCy d,ute for any other form of military
V^hly, little has been written /[^ m.e present century on the history SSo.erican coastal fortification, which Stis ,°ng 'ay near the very core of U. S. Ses6 Planning. Occasional graduate °r journal articles and a few works
by non-historians, who have approached the subject from technical, architectural, and aesthetic perspectives, have been published. However, no serious, first- class study has appeared examining the place in American defense history of the relatively enormous expenditures—the planning, funds, engineering skills, and soldierly dedication invested in the construction, arming, and manning of the coastal forts—made by this country throughout the 19th century and as late as World War II. The examination of those undertakings is the substance of Browning’s significant new work.
Its author reveals an extraordinary grasp of the complex of factors— geography, economics, technology, “national” values—which led to, and sustained, this one approach to defense that was so attractive to several generations of Americans and their representatives in Washington. D.C. Traces, if not the substance, of this approach (albeit in altered forms) persist to the present, lending timeliness to the study.
As tempting as it is to detail the volume’s many literary strengths (its one “weakness” is its temporal scope, which might have been extended to encompass the whole history of such defense through World War II), the work is important because it is the first book-length effort in a century to look seriously at this specific element of U. S. military history and thought. For this reason alone it is of great moment.
Browning displays a sensitive economy of words and manages to cover the subject in roughly 200 pages. Compact and readable, yet comprehensive, the book is an exceptional achievement and of considerable value to anyone professionally involved with defense, and to everyone who has grown up in an era in which the term “deterrence” has been prominent, and at times dominant, in the defense vocabulary.
For those who have the impression that the term and concept of deterrence date from the Eisenhower administration and “massive retaliation,” the work provides both balance and historic insight with regard to the nation’s perspective on the idea of defense-through-deterrence. In
addition, the book may shed some light on the very murky question of where the country ought to be going.
Dr. Lewis is a past contributor to the Proceedings and has written extensively on coastal artillery and harbor defense. His principal work is Seacoast Fortifications of the United States (the Smithsonian Institution 1970). At present, he is Librarian of the U. S. House of Representatives.
ES SBS: The Invisible Raiders
James D. Ladd. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 283 pp. Illus. Ind. Append. $15.95 ($12.76).
Reviewed by Captain John Coote, Royal Navy (Retired)
The subtitle of this book, “The History of the SBS from World War II to the Present,” may mislead those who think of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) only as an elite club of versatile professional killers within the Royal Marines—the seaborne, but more gentlemanly, equivalent of the Special Air Service (SAS). The cadre had its origin in many small private armies, disliked and mistrusted by all but a handful of top brass. Luckily the SBS appealed to the style and nature of the then- head of Britain’s Combined Operations (Commandos), Admiral Louis Mountbat- ten, who took over in 1942 just at the time of the Bruneval and Bordeaux raids. Mountbatten subsequently used these forces with devastating effect in every military theater in which he controlled the course of events.
Today, the expression “a bit special” has become part of the language of English understatement. In a 1940 thesaurus, the adjective carried mostly an idea of eccentricity. Certainly the SBS boats themselves were not special—mostly bought off the shelf from camping suppliers, unwieldy, unstable, and awkward to assemble atop the casing of a vulnerable submarine off a hostile beach on a moonless night. Despite the fact that the Germans and Japanese summarily executed all those captured who failed to rendezvous with the submarine that had launched them the previous day or two, there was no lack of volunteers for these special irregulars. Royal Marines
SAS is fascinating. Both formations conceal a high degree of deep mutual respect. Their roles are almost interchangeable, except that the SAS is called upon to deal with terrorists who intrude on civilized life, while the Royal Marines’ SBS concentrates on military targets.
This book is the first record of the accomplishments of an extraordinary group of men. For some reason—possibly censorship—it doesn’t bring to life the character of those involved. The record is deadpan, understated, and rather heavy going. One almost has to read between the lines to appreciate the sheer bravery of the volunteers who kept coming forward to face almost insurmountable goals, knowing they had little chance of survival. Nonetheless, SBS: The Invisible
were involved from the earliest days of the little boat raiders, but their charter members were drawn from all the fighting services.
My first experience with the SBS was when the legendary Major Roger “Jumbo” Courtney turned up with a companion in the bombed-out wardroom of the Tenth Submarine Flotilla’s base on Manoel Island in Malta. No one asked why they were there. The next morning they simply didn’t show for breakfast, having slipped away the night before after the bar shut down in one of our subs to dynamite a bridge in Sicily or survey a beach for the invasion of Europe.
The Combined Operations Assault Pilotage Party led by Commander Nigel Clogstoun-Willmott, a single-minded, testy professional Royal Navy navigation specialist, was one of the most effective predecessors of the SBS, delivering to theater commanders detailed surveys of beaches earmarked for amphibious assault from Normandy to Burma. He used every known means of getting to the target area, including mini-submarines (X- craft) and wet suits. Unlike most of his men, he survived the war and sails his small yacht every summer from Chichester to Spitzbergen and Jan Mayen Island.
The book’s appendix lists no fewer than 43 SBS “related organizations,” of which about half involved Royal Marines. The marines first got into the SBS business as the Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment. Their cover story fooled no one. The only harbor booms they ever came close to were on enemy coasts.
To this day, the SBS flourishes as a tight-lipped, publicity-shy outfit based at Poole in Dorset County, South England. Unlike the SAS, they are never allowed more than two years’ duty in the group, wear military haircuts, and are rotated back to ceremonial and other more traditional Royal Marine duties before they can get too far out of hand. From their SBS duty, they take the sort of military expertise which has terrified the Argentinians and has contributed significantly to the effectiveness of Britain’s armed forces.
Ladd’s overlap of the SBS with the
Raiders earns a place high on the Hst 1 contemporary military history.
• ~r #
Captain Coote was a Royal Navy submarine saw war service off Norway and in the Mediterfa ^ and later held four sea commands, 1948-54. ^ \ 38, he resigned to go into newspaper publish* Fleet Street, ending his civilian career as L' f Chairman of Beaverbrook Newspapers.
Closed File: The True Story Behind the Execution of Breaks Morant and Peter Handcock
Kit Denton. Australia: Rigby Publishers. 1983. 160 pp. Approx. $19.20.
Reviewed by Colonel James H. Jeffr>eS III, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
v P
Australian writer Kit Denton s Breaker was a dramatized account 0
Chief of Combined Operations in Europe Admiral Lord Louis Mountbat- ten, seen inspecting commandoes before a raid in 1941, understood the value of the elite professionals of the Special Boat Squadron and used these forces effectively in every theater in which he commanded.
bet *
s book is not a totally unbiased
acCl
;°unt.
tliat > acbnowied8eti in his first book caus £ ^ad n0t wr'tten a true history be- G0ve °f “the obduracy of the British bei^ent in refusing to release a num- essential documents.” Despite this ton.;' Waming, a large segment of Den- readers and viewers of the film are
^ss
As
■rnent.
line who perceive the
«v,
j as a gross miscarriage of justice. V„?Ukt’ much of this impression is
cauSe
of the masterful cinematic au-
tk
k
tti l ■ "‘6 ui gum ui innocence.
- is i *alest book, Denton proves that l Vv CCd a trutb seeker. The wide pop- e|Ped t*le i‘rst book and the film has V anHUncover new sources of informa- Hjcg evidence about the case, much of oebunks or casts an entirely new
tioar cr'mes trial, conviction, and execu- g nof two Australian lieutenants of the sh Veldt Carbineers (BVC). The BVC Unc °ne °f Lord Horatio H- Kitchener’s aSa°nVent*°na* wadare un'ts deployed the |!jSt the Boer commandos operating in S orthern Transvaal at the close of the pUL?nd B°er War. This earlier book, side*f*d in 1973, went unnoticed out- pa Australia until it was republished in J'rev aC^ *n 198 1 Washington Square lCaS' ps republication followed the re- ■g6 °f the highly acclaimed film fl^e,aker Morant,” based on The Prorri ' Th'S resur§ence of interest also ten a tCd the rePrinting of the only writ- >he CC°Unt °i the affair offered by any of participants. Scapegoats of the Em- ty0fT!le True Stor>' °f Breaker 4 h"!* s Bushveldt Carbineers (Angus PtintrtSon Publishers, 1982) is a re- Br„., °* the book written in 1907 by ka ^ Cr Morant’s co-defendant, George WiftSdf'e Witton. As might be expected,
cjn(jidessential documents.” Despite this 'on’s'
i°nslnced that Morant and his compan- ■5 (j 'Vere victims of Imperial politics and ili^i rehead court-martial dominated by M)o ener’s command influence. Those law atftend the Marine Corps’ week-long NaVa| War course, conducted at the Is|a‘ “ar College in Newport, Rhode at q ’ the Command and Staff College Vat antico, Virginia, and at West Coast arid p°nS’ where the Breaker Morant film trajpj Serninar based on it are part of the n§ syllabus, tend to agree with this tonSj an instructor of the course, I am V"ent'y impressed by the number of t)ffi„ Judge advocates and experienced ers of the
viiivuiauv au-
^tins ^ilm and the competent
^aC[j of the players. But some of the He p°n is> perhaps, also attributable to 11 ,rr0chial view that only proceedings 'Ct Compliance with the Uniform vaiid Military Justice can lead to a lnding of guilt or innocence.
light on the Breaker Morant affair. Fortunately for students of the case, Denton has skillfully collected and assembled this new information to capture the “real” Breaker Morant. Denton originally presented Breaker Morant as a diamond in the rough: black-sheep son of a distinguished English family, poet, natural troop leader, Victorian romantic, rough-and-ready soldier, horseman without peer, renaissance man, and martyr to the politics of the British Empire. Though Morant may have been all of these, Closed File provides a new descriptive list: possible imposter, drunkard,
womanizer, brawler, gambler, deadbeat, evidence tamperer, and war criminal.
In this book, Denton acknowledges that there was no willful withholding of information by the British Government and that the records of the court martial— which consisted of several trials that Denton originally consolidated into one proceeding for dramatic purposes—were likely destroyed around 1922 as part of a routine records destruction program. There is also no persuasive evidence supporting claims of Kitchener’s personal interference in the trials or the defendants’ assertion that there existed an unqualified high command order to summarily shoot any Boer caught wearing British khaki. Such an order would not have been permissible under the then (and now) prevailing law of war.
More likely, if such an order had indeed existed it would have directed commonwealth Forces to try (and, if appropriate, execute) any Boer wearing khaki with the intent to deceive. (See, for example, Article 23[f] of the Hague Regulations to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land: “. . . it is especially forbidden ... to make improper use ... of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy.”)
What was not permissible, either then or now, was for Morant, a lieutenant-patrol leader, to convene a spontaneous “court-martial” in the field and execute a captured Boer prisoner alleged to be wearing the khaki jacket of Morant’s slain captain. As for the issue of Kitchener’s alleged manipulation of the trial proceedings, the truth of the matter is probably closer to the observation made by Thomas Packenham in his The Boer War (Random House, 1979) that: “There arose a misconception (still current) that foreign political pressures had induced Kitchener to make scapegoats of Morant and Handcock. In fact, Kitchener’s motives were cruder: evidence of his own army’s indiscipline drove him wild with frustration.”
Although the complete picture of the court-martial will never be known, the following facts are not contested. Shortly after the combat death of his close friend Captain Hunt, Morant led an assault on a Boer encampment and captured a Boer named Josef Visser who was alleged to be wearing some of Hunt’s uniform. Contrary to all existing military regulations and the customary law of war, Morant convened a drumhead court (considerably less formal than the one which convicted him) and ordered Visser to be shot. Later, sixty-one members of the BVC signed a letter requesting investigation of widespread atrocities by their officers in which they attested that when Visser was executed, Lieutenant Morant was himself wearing the clothes of the late Captain Hunt.
Additional testimony revealed an incident a week or so later during which a BVC patrol was bringing in eight or nine prisoners and was met by Morant, Hand- cock, Witton, and a small troop. The patrol was relieved of its prisoners and sent on to Fort Edward. The prisoners were then executed along the roadside. Shortly thereafter, it is believed, a German missionary, Daniel Heese, drove past the scene. After conversing with Morant, Handcock was seen riding out with his
carbine in the same direction as Heese_______
who was later found shot to death. All of these events were detailed at the trials in a larger context relating the routine murders of numerous prisoners and soldiers who were killed trying to surrender under a flag of truce.
The real issue at the trials, and in the literature and the film, is not whether the defendants committed the crimes; they were clearly guilty. The issue is whether they were following orders (especially orders of the high command), and subsequently whether they should be held personally and criminally accountable for their actions. A lesser question is the fairness of the trials. Closed File shows a much fairer proceeding than the admitted literary license taken in the film.
As any student of war crimes knows, the defense of superior orders, while possibly of some mitigating effect, is not a legal defense. Denton suggests in Closed File that Morant was a cold, calculating murderer who received more due process than he gave his victims. The only question still open is how many other Morants” should have met the same fate, but were spared censure.
Colonel Jeffries is a practicing attorney and executive officer of the Marine Corps Law of War training detachment, a reserve unit located in Washington, D.C.
3 FREE ISSUES!
All newly commissioned officers and warrant officers in the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are eligible for three free introductory issues of Proceedings!
For more information contact: Membership Services • U.S. Naval Institute .Annapolis, Maryland *21402 (301) 268-6110
USNI Mug
Our blue and white porcelain mug holds 11 ounces of your favorite beverage. High quality, dishwasher safe. Only $5.50.
Use the order form in the "Books ot Interest" section to buy one for home and one for the office, too.
_ For Members Onl^
Ship and Aircraft
Photographs
Available
Choose from more than 35,000 photos dating back to 1883!
For order form and information write to:
Photo Service U.S. Naval Institute
Annapolis, Maryland 21402 (301) 268-6110
The Final Collapse
General Cao Van Vien. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History. United States Army, 1983. 177 pp. Ind.
Reviewed by Eric McAllister Smith
Wherever they appeared in South Vietnam, they were nicknamed “Saigon Cowboys” by contemptuous U. S. soldiers. These “Cowboys” were the Vietnamese draft dodgers—military-age
males and deserters who, by the thousands, dawdled on street corners and cruised their country openly on black market motorbikes. To American soldiers, they were discouraging evidence that the youth of their even younger nation was uncommitted to fighting for its survival.
The collective opinion of the U. S. forces as they left Vietnam in 1972 was that such a divided, corrupt people would never survive an onslaught by their more militaristic enemies to the north. In April 1975, that opinion was swiftly and terribly transformed into reality.
The Final Collapse is the story of South Vietnam’s chaotic last days as witnessed by General Cao Van Vien, who served as chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff for a decade before the fall of Saigon. He recounts in exhausting detail the circumstances supporting the high-level decisions which led to the abandonment of large areas of South Vietnam to the advancing, opportunistic North Vietnamese.
Faced with supply shortages, reduced air power, and the frightening loss of what the author terms the “American Big Brother,” South Vietnam’s President Nguyen van Thieu chose in mid-March 1975 to concede to the enemy most northern and western provinces of his country so he might defend what was left more effectively.
It was a rash, and ultimately fatal, concession. By the end of the month, Thicu’s troops had been chased from the demilitarized zone and the central highlands, to vulnerable coastal enclaves crowded with panicky refugees. Surprised and encouraged by their successes, North Vietnamese commanders expanded their probing attacks into full-scale offensives.
The South Vietnamese strategic withdrawal quickly became a rout, and then a desperate flight to last-ditch rallying points along the South China Sea. As victorious communist troops poured across Highway One into former U. S. base camps at Danang and Chu Lai, a Dun- kirk-style naval evacuation took battered South Vietnamese units offshore to Cu Lao Re Island to regroup. But, despite the effort, the end was near.
fe*
The final collapse which came a weeks later was a shock to strate^J(j whose counterinsurgency theories
largely dominated the warfare u>
Indo
china. Saigon did not fall, as expec
:ted.“
the peasant insurgents who had pb?u
French and then American forces
for
long, but to a well-equipped North
Viet-
illery-
namese army with tanks, heavy art'.
le.lfa”
Vietn^
and a conventional order of battle, lesson may be learned from the Vi< ^
experience, it is that guerrilla
alone often win battles while seldom
wit1"
(or
ning wars—a lesson of relevance ^ contemporary U. S. policy plannerSjn. they consider the proper response t0y surgent movements around the w°
especially in Latin America.
In his influential but contro
,vers'1
\i
press-
book, On Strategy (Presidio ‘ 5
1983), Colonel Harry G. Summers.
Army, argues that it was Hanoi s >
• X A
tion all along to win the way it 0(
that guerrilla tactics were only a pjji “economy of force operation on the r(
of North Vietnam to buy time and to
down superior U. S. military for00f With a war-weary United States ^
the way, Hanoi was free to prepare^|(. huge logistical buildup, described >n ^
Final Collapse, that allowed it to rap
exploit South Vietnam’s weakne
:sse5-
:0lf
One weakness of the Saigon high c mand was its belief that it woul^.^e
almost limitless U. S. support, - growing evidence to the contrary sU
ing years prior to America’s pull° ' y
This assumption is reflected in
niaa)
k niii ujjuuipiioii iu iviivvvvw -
General Vien’s self-serving state ^
and veiled accusations concerning
The
sponsibility for his country’s defeat 3y inclusion of such biases in his boo ^
be excused after taking into accoun^y,
foreword which claims The Find lapse was never intended to be a j anced, definitive history, but ra “source material” for further stud;
Although the author is fluent "Uf glish, the book was written with the y,. tance of editors from the Genera •< search Corporation and the U. S. A> « Center of Military History. As a the book’s language tends to be * ,> and its military terminology P fit somewhat confusing. But, betwee^ ^ lines of dry, almost impersonal proofreader can still hear the crack ot tional backbone, see its martial (dc ^ j raveling, and feel the final agony. $ weak young country that never h chance to grow up. ..
Eric Smith was an Army intelligence officer f f
iivv. ggtv
nam. He earned his law degree from jcl1
i artist an
University in 1972 before becoming an i umnist for The Capital, in Annapolis, MU
132
Proceedings / Novem
ber ‘
$
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U. S. Navy
■25),
it1"8 fTOm
vete.
’ince th . UK ikukmis ui rtsia uuring an the ^ 6 yietnam War. An important theme i„ since th£r'Can ttnderinvolvement in East Asia e U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam.
\ pi*
&ete 'na Quandary: Domestic
1982 m,nants of U. S. China Policy, 1972-
:rt Q c
19^ ^titter. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
resident Richard M. Nixon journeyed tjor ?oples Republic of China in 1972, Cultura| Vances in economic- political, and "'ith t(, relations followed. But associated hilt 0se advances came a number of diffi- Hat U^st>°ns with no expedient answers. Chichi be the extent of U. S. aid to Chiha hould the United States sell arms to
vrbengage . -
sary ^ ltb China against our common adver
V B ” '
^dt ^nts
to
[0, ^"eyelopedia of Drug Abuse
b °Cri Q>p .
> 0 °ncn and Sidney Cohen. New York:
, ---------------- "O ' “““ V'1
souse, the information is presented
Asja.^?ler’ean Role in Vietnam and East • etvveen Two Revolutions
1984 iq'Tenny- New Y°rk: Praeger Publishers, <$24„, PP- Bib. Notes. Ind. Tables. $26.95
an impressive bank of creden- fSI Point graduate, two-tour Vietnam d°r 1q j ‘Ofmer special assistant to Ambassa- staff ,JaPan Mike Mansfield, former deputy on |yjjlrector of the House Select Committee cun-e‘Ssin8 Persons in Southeast Asia, and marpg member of the Arms Control and Disarms div * ^ency—Dr. Kenny has synthesized ful -e baclcground to construct an insight- in Vj r ^dressing the American experience r°]e jnnam in terms of its effect on the U. S. focUstae Postwar Far East, With a special Contra°.n ^'na an<J Japan, he compares and Asja- S s tbe two revolutions occurring in East luti0ney°lutionary communism and the revolve ° Political and economic changes that titleePl the free nations of Asia during and
\y, PP- Notes. Ind. $22.50 ($20.25). fen J
the People"’
' ‘S anM U11U pn,-
'* a Sp . eyaluates policy options. The author sit>tla| |aCla,ist In Asian affairs at the Congresses tjsearch Service of the Library of Con- fDrthenp ^ormer analyst in East Asian affairs Central Intelligence Agency.
Ij)(
k
FkTS0 ......
APpcndn ^iIe- Inc., 1984. 454 pp. Bib. „,u.
Vitli ' lables- 540.00 ($36.00).
than 1,000 entries, some several X»e, w°rds in length, this alphabetically 'S both Col*ectl°n of information about drugs lf|e bi0jCXt?nsive and easy to use. Dealing with dtu 0g*cal. sociological, and legal aspects
with a minimum of technical language and is accompanied by an introductory section entitled, “History of Drugs and Man." The bibliography and appendices are useful to those who seek additional sources, and two of the three appendices aid in the translation of street language and slang translations. For those who must deal with some form of drug abuse in their personal or professional lives, or for anyone who wants to be more informed on this serious aberration of American society, this book will prove a valuable reference.
E3 Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945
Peter C. Smith. Ashbourne, UK: Moorland Publishing, 1984. Published and Distributed by the Naval Institute Press. 255 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind.
Maps. Tables. $14.95 ($11.96).
During the years of conflict between England and Germany during World War II, many sea battles occurred in the narrow waters that separate the British Isles from continental Europe. The participants ranged from tiny patrol craft to mighty battleships. Outgoing and incoming convoys were attacked; German destroyers often penetrated British coastal waters to sow deadly fields of mines; and raids and evacuations were frequently undertaken. This book is a detailed study of the Royal Navy’s role in keeping England’s gateway secure. Replete with photographs of many of the participants and tables which compare and contrast various factors of engagements, this historical account is a unique record of a relatively small but extremely important aspect of naval warfare in World War II.
E9 How to Survive on Land and Sea
Frank C. Craighead, Jr., and John J. Craighead Revised by Ray E. Smith and D. Shiras Jarvis. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984 Illus Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($11.96).
Originally published in 1943 as a compilation of the best known survival techniques used by instructors in the Navy’s V-5 program of World War II, this fourth edition of the classic work has been updated and expanded to include the latest in the art and science of survival. This exceptionally comprehensive book is divided into three sections: “Land Survival,” “Water Survival,” and “Natural Disasters Survival.” Techniques for abandoning oil rigs, obtaining water in the desert by creating a vegetation still, predicting volcanic danger, and other related topics are covered. Psychological as well as physical aspects of survival are addressed, and specific first aid procedures for each type of survival environment are included.
International Security Dimensions of Space
Uri Ra’anan and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., editors. Hamden, CT: The Shoe String Press, 1984. 324 pp. Notes. Ind. Append. Tables. $32.50 ($29.25).
In the spring of 1982, experts in the field of space technology, comprising representatives from the U. S. government, private industry, the military, and foreign governments, gathered at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University to share information and views. This book is a compilation of the papers prepared for that conference. Topics include “Space As a Military Environment," “National Interests and the Legal Regime in Space," and "Technological and Operational Aspects of Superpower Space Systems,” among others. Several relevant appendices round out the work.
Israel After Begin
Daniel Garron. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1984. 199 pp. $13.95 ($12.55).
tl'ilgs / November 1984
A noted journalist from the Jerusalem Post discusses the past, present, and future of Israel as a nation facing many challenging dilemmas in a milieu of strife. It is a realistic assessment of an intensely difficult and complicated situation, yet one not devoid of hope. Analyzing the impact of the war in Lebanon and the reaction of the Israeli people (more than a tenth of the entire population demonstrated against their government s participation in that war), this book provides relevant perspectives for both Americans and Israelis. Noted author Howard Fast writes of this book: “This is the
, so<
to create this nautical etymology, and has
and handling cost will be billed to^h^ute ber. Books marked 03 are Press Books. Books marked fifl al V£r id' Institute Book Selections. For fur ^ (a|| formation about these books (B. SjLn<jfl (301)224-3378, ext. 34. For informal ^ the other books, call ext. 31. Use t form provided in this section.
most penetrating 'analysis of the situation in Israel that I have ever read.”
Napoleon at War: Selected Writings of F. Loraine Petre
Albert A. Nofi, Editor. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1984. 291 pp. Bib. Notes. Ind. Maps. Charts. Tables. $ 19.95 ($17.95).
In 1900, a British civil servant retired from service and embarked upon a study of Napoleon. Neither a soldier nor a scholar, F. Loraine Petre produced a five-volume series on the Napoleonic campaigns which is recognized by many historians as the most incisive and clearly written treatise on the subject. This book presents an edited version of that monumental work, with each selection carefully chosen to illustrate the tactical and strategic genius of Napoleon. Major topics covered are “The Politics of War,” “Organization and Planning,” “Strategy,” and “Battle.”
NATO Under Attack: Why the Western Alliance Can Fight Outnumbered and Win in Central Europe Without Nuclear Weapons.
F. W. von Mellenthin and R. H. S. Stolfi with E. Sobik. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1984. 161 pp. Bib. Notes. Ind. Tables. $22.75 ($20.50) (hardcover). $10.75 ($9.70) (paper).
Placing great emphasis upon historical analogy, these well-qualified authors apply lessons learned in the past toward the formulation of viable strategy. Proffering a conventional scenario emphasizing the “superior, action-oriented, independent command style of the Germans and Western Allies,” and limiting the counter-objectives of NATO forces in restoring the West German border as opposed to penetrating the Eastern bloc, the authors contend that the required use of tactical nuclear weapons by either side can be avoided. Detailed assessments of both sides are provided, and some widely accepted assumptions are forcefully challenged.
Negotiating the Law of the Sea
James K. Sebenius. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. 251 pp. Bib. Notes. Ind. Tables. $20.00 ($18.00).
This scholarly work analyzes the complex negotiations involved in formulating the recent Law of the Sea (LOS) treaty, and derives from that experience certain techniques for negotiating effective agreements. The rejection of that treaty by the United States, as well as the role of a computer model in the talks, are also analyzed. The book makes extensive use of mathematical formulae and graphic representations of data and variables, and is not for the average reader.
Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli- PLO War in Lebanon.
Richard A. Gabriel. New York: Hill and Wang, 1984. 242 pp. Ind. Notes. Maps. Tables. $16.95 ($15.25).
On 6 June 1982, the Israeli Defense Force, demonstrating remarkable coordination and rapidity, launched an assault into Lebanon aimed at destroying the PLO enclave there. This book is the first to cover the ensuing war that ultimately involved many other nations including the United States. The first chapter provides good background material by summarizing the histories of the two main competitors. Subsequent chapters develop and analyze the events of the war in careful detail. Based on hundreds of interviews of soldiers, guerrillas, commanders, and civilians, the work is insightful and thorough in its treatment of this important historical event.
Origins of Sea Terms
John G. Rogers. Mystic, CT: Mystic ^eaPOIl]j.00 Museum, 1984. 215 pp. Bib. Ind. Appena ($13.50).
For those who think “caboose” origin*1 ^ .s a railroad word, or who think “dungarees # term of modem origin, or who don t ^ what a “raffee” is, this book will be a ^ come addition to the nautical booksn total of 1,249 entries and several 'nt^ti0n- appendices have been compiled into a ^ ary format. The book is laced with makes enjoyable reading, as well as a ^ reference document. Mr. Rogers SPC years researching ancient and moden1uset.
a concise format to include bibliograp 1 as well as the time-frame and linguistic of the terms.
BOOK ORDER SERVICE
Prices enclosed by parentheses arc ber prices. Members may order rn^sva| in- of other publishers through the Na -^s stitute at a 10% discount off list Pr*ce‘cjiange quoted in this column are subject to ^ and will be reflected in our billing ! vS| allow for delays when ordering n°j!erspe' Institute titles. When air mail or o* cial handling is requested, actual P ^
i ii- _ - * _ *i! tn the 1
Naval lH* are
,--1
YA4K
Order Form
U.S. Naval Institute
2062 Generals Highway Annapolis, Maryland 21401
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
$
Qty.
Insignia Items (Specify color/size if necessary)
Name ______
Membership No. Address
City. State, FPO
. Zip Code
Shipping fees (refer to shipping chart). Maryland residents, please add 5% sales tax.
Enclosed is my check or money order for the total.
□ Charge it to my
□ Bill me
VISA9
Account Number
Expiration Date
Signature
SHIPPING CHART
Add postage and handling to each order for Naval Institute ^ book selections, and insignia items according to the following (0 dule: $2.25 for orders up to SI5.00: $3.00 for orders from $l5V S30.00: $3.75 for any order in excess of $30.00. . aI1
Add $1.75 per book for special orders from U.S. publishers other the Naval Institute Press. book5
Add $2.50 for postage and handling to each special order for from foreign publishers. -*■
book5-
136
Proceedings / Novel"
b‘r