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Good battle training demands expert team training—a combat information center team shown in action—but the current SORM is not providing the proper organization to permit such training. A new SORM could solve this problem and thus improve the battle readiness of our ships.
■ (t pr0^s
At the time of this writing, U. S. seag0'0^^i#1’ sionals are addressing a matter as cr't'CdNVCapo|1, ^ effectiveness as the concept of a new j to dll- intricate as the design of a new ship, and as outcome of future naval battles as any new mas *- or battle tactic. darfO1.
This matter concerns a new SORM—the ^ p]d'-
ganization and Regulations Manual of the ' ( jn d1 (OpNav Instruction 3120.32). No other docum
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30
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4yimnassive library of rules and guidelines so power- ill p Cts 011 fighting capabilities of the U. S. fleets
c J. MAROON
Pfescfi^httue to for°so long into the future. The SORM Rifled S aow U. S. man o’warmen will be organized, ttetj^t’e re§ulated, 'et^ an^ —in many respects— ^°u beijet0 become ar|d rema'n an ehte fighting force. If ^rfaj-e 'n the criticality of human performance in Alth0’u ,en believe in the SORM’s criticality.
§h seldom directly consulted on board ship, the
SORM forms the main bridge between the lessons of experience and research, on the one hand, and the management tools available to seagoing leadership, on the other. Unfortunately, the Navy still has no standing agency charged with continuing responsibility for analyzing the extraordinary problems and possibilities inherent in the design of shipboard management systems, for incorporating the findings of management research, or for keeping track of lessons learned from accident and action reports. This article, therefore, addresses one major aspect of the SORM—the impact of shipboard organization systems upon readiness for battle—and offers recommendations derived from intensive examinations of both theoretical concepts and the warship environment.1
Of all the features of this bible called SORM. its rules of organization have the greatest influence upon combat effectiveness. Any organizational arrangement is a system for prescribing chains of control and accountability for functions a group has to perform. In a warship, these functions include living, working, relaxing, growing, operating, training, and fighting—the reasons why this particular organization exists. Combat requires many “normal” functions to be performed rapidly and precisely—even though leaders are being killed, structures crushed, tools scattered or destroyed, communications disrupted, and key operators severely injured, paralyzed, or panicked by fear. No business or governmental agency demands so much of its organizational structure as the naval warship.
The standardization of shipboard organization was adopted early in this century largely through the efforts of then-Lieutenant Ernest J. King.2 During the years since Lieutenant King’s initiative, the basic arrangement by dedepartments and divisions has become oriented increasingly toward maintenance and administration, rather than emphasizing battle control and battle training as its designers intended. Although the primary basis of internal organization is still alleged to be a ship’s “requirements for battle," today more than half of the crew of a typical U. S. warship will report to different leaders for battle than they will for their routine work. The most important leaders— to most junior enlisted men on board warships today—are likely to be the supervisors of their daily maintenance work, not their supervisors in battle or battle training.
The Current State of Training for Battle: The ability of ships to train for battle has declined so much that each ship now requires several weeks of externally assisted refresher training not only after major overhauls but before every scheduled overseas deployment, as well. Among experienced fleet personnel I contacted recently, nearly all concur that after such refresher training, levels of battle training for many types of shipboard teams (particularly teams drawn from mixed divisions and departments) deteriorate steadily—even during deployments, when crews are relatively stable. One warship commanding officer (described by his flag-level superior as a leading expert in training) said recently that in his view there are two schools of thought in today’s operating Navy:
► Shipboard efforts must be almost totally devoted to material readiness.
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Ju|y 1986
31
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alone. My design must provide a clear chain c- ^ for battle training, and it must account for • -red
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integrated team skills (for example, those req^ jjffel
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battle; therefore, my people must
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► Shipboard efforts must go substantially beyond material readiness, to include achievement and maintenance of overall ability to fight.
This commanding officer added that he, regrettably, was forced to belong to the first school because preparing for material readiness inspections consumes nearly all available time and—put bluntly—there are no “points” given for maintaining or improving overall ability to fight after refresher training. Several veteran master and senior chief petty officers observed in other interviews that they had “never been in or seen” a ship they thought was truly ready to fight.
In the event of a sudden or imminent conflict, externally assisted refresher training would not be available to many ships of the fleet, including most of those already deployed or urgently needed in forward areas. And since shipboard self-training for battle is apparently no longer succeeding, it must be concluded that most U. S. warships today are inadequately trained to cope with an extreme combat emergency.
The Meaning of Full Battle Readiness: The critical action toward strengthening the content of the new SORM is to begin it with a definition of full battle readiness. The outgoing SORM does not do this. Thus, it neglects to establish a solid foundation for anything it tries to say about organization, training, maintenance, administration, morale, leadership, or the primary reasons for every regulation it seeks to standardize. (Articles or figures in the outgoing SORM are cited throughout this discussion by numerals in parentheses.)
Full battle readiness should mean the “ability form all designed functions under conditions o ^ ^ stress, extreme violence, and/or attempted surprise- .jy definition would imply a demand for far greater cap ^ than suggested by “operational readiness’ — for used (if rarely) in the old SORM.3 Full battle rea ,n jty U. S. warships demands more than an individua c for courage or heroism, more than extraordinary ^ endurance, and more than the ability to maintain ment in peak condition for long periods under ^ t0 conditions. The qualities that comprise expert a . ^ fight apply in port as well as at sea. They apply t0^atant" support and auxiliary ships as well as to cortlgin ships, for no fleet can survive with its resuppty ^ ce. disrupted. And they make no distinction between ^ n0 time” and “wartime,” for the next major bn more likely to wait for a declaration of war than assault on Pearl Harbor.
Objectives for Organizational Design: Let us n j pose that I have been given command of a ship as £ one of the Navy’s operational test and ^evewjtj, de*
groups. My group commander has charged me - an
signing from the keel up—and, if approved, tes ‘ ‘optimal’ ’ system of shipboard organization. He
ground rules: a sustainfu"
- My central objective must be to achieve ana
battle readiness as defined earlier. Jjen °r
- I must act on the premise that in the case o aVajl- imminent hostilities, external facilities will no
able to help my ship prepare to fight.
My proposal takes shape as follows. ... n of First, in order to fit the prescribed definij10 ^gjfic battle readiness, my design should support hv objectives: ronditi0'1
- Maintain Hull and Equipment in Designearesp°n'
For this purpose, my organization must distrib ^nei by sibilities for maintenance and repair, group Per ^ pet' technical skills, and optimize technical training sonnel stability. . „attie
- Sustain the Skills Necessary to Operate (,VeVed Designed Proficiency: Once these skills are ac * trainin-' the help of shakedown or post-overhaul refres . ^ajnin?
and fleet schools, they must be sustained by .1tT1rnaria »/!., a„„: * „ ,lMr r-hain Of , 0
launch major ordnance or to extinguish a large from individual skills. .
► Maximize Physical Stamina: Since my sn'P designed to require a minimum number of Pc[S°jnlpu- crew member’s performance will be critically ^ a|| ip) Yet human beings will be the most vulnerable ^ physl4 resources in
My organizational design must distribute resp1 for attaining these conditions. ^
► Maximize Psychological Stamina: My crC able to withstand severe mental stress and con i
-hips” tA°n 3S ' basic organization typical of all '^Pliesth an^ ^'8- 2-1)- As the text proceeds, it
s*sts 0f ,at ihe primary shipboard chain of command con- ^ Com ae ^'lowing hierarchy:
- Standing officer
- C„,l,c officer
Partment heads
fo •
ino cWlth Precision, without panicking and without mak- Wiu bntlcal mistakes. The foundations of these strengths thgjr.2 °ei'ef in their cause, confidence in themselves and One fammates’ ar>d a strong sense of integrity and honor. Prim m°St Powerpul sources of such strengths is mUst ^ §r°up cohesion.” My organizational design their ■ 6ar^ define these primary groups and promote
y 0;)nterna* C°ilesi°n-
can"nize Responsiveness to Sudden Demand: No ship T0coay lnstantly ready for all contingencies all the time, dents t6 Wlt^ emergencies that can range from major acci- mit r. °terrorism to surprise attacks, my design must per- °ther lifting from any readiness condition to any ing at sea or in port, without becoming vulnerable dur- afterw *ransition or sacrificing cohesion beforehand or each o ™ * must ensure the organizational integrity of ity a(° 0UP and of the chains of command and responsibil- conH;.°SS a** 8r°ups, regardless of variations and shifts in TdUl0ns of readiness.
the trauma of organizational change, any fr°m Z rearrangements ought to vary as little as possible to^ej ct Pracdces to which my crew has been accusin' ”°W We^’ then, could these objectives be met if I 1Zed according to the existing SORM?
Tfig p . .
kre: Xlstlng SORM’s Primary Organizational Struc-
“chajnsC CUrrent SORM establishes two main shipboard titled* c°mmand” depending on functions to be per- shall c. i?ne ^or maintenance and administration (which I refers (a M&A) and one for watchstanding. The latter t>attle t. V.ar'ous conditions of readiness: Condition I for Pcacct'l 1'S’ ^ or ^ Por high-alert steaming; IV for diti0n • ,1ITle cruising; and V for in-port routine. No con- Alth SPec'hed for sustained high alert in port.
Ptents thc old SORM also states that, “The require- UnitS” /°5 ^atde shall be the basis for the organization of °rgani?. .rt' 210), it goes on to define the administrative
- Departmental assistants
- Division officers
- Division leading petty officers
- Work center supervisors
- Work center members (remainder of ship’s company) This M&A structure distributes authority and accountability for almost every aspect of on-board daily life: technical and military training; recommendations for advancement and reenlistment; assignments to individual stations and duties; evaluations of performance; inspections; assemblies for muster and instruction; keeping records; supervising work; acting upon special requests; scheduling leave and liberty; supervising organized recreation; and maintaining discipline.
Division officers are often said to be the mainstays of any ship’s organization. Each of these key officers is currently charged by Article 351 to:
- “Train his subordinates in their own duties”
- “Carefully instruct his subordinates in all applicable safety precautions”
- “Ensure optimum material conditions of readiness”
- “Supervise the administration of the Personnel Qualification Standards [training] system”
- “Supervise the administration and performance of the work centers within his Division in carrying out the shipboard maintenance and material management system”
- “Schedule and conduct training for personnel assigned to the Division,” including “team training to fulfill operational requirements of the Division”
During recent years, however, the SORM has incorporated new assignments of tasks and duties that bypass or cut through these basic responsibilities of division officers disconcertingly. (Table 1 provides example.)
Across the department-division structure, the old SORM also prescribes an “organization for training” (812) that implies, in diagram form, that the division officers’ responsibilities for training are subject to supervision by a ship’s training officer as well as by their respective department training officers. This “Training Organization” is never defined as a clear chain of authority and accountability.5
Some of the inconsistencies created by these provisions have resulted from careless design or writing and need only cosmetic attention. Some can be “cured” by pre-
Table 1 SORM Organizational Assignments
First Lieutenant (329)
Ordnance Officer (329)
Battery Control Officer (331) Electronics Readiness Officer (331) Computer Maintenance Officer (331) System Test Officer (331)
Combat Information Center Officer (324.1)
Electronics Material Officer (324.2) Gunnery Officer (329)
Fire Control Officer (329) Antisubmarine Warfare Officer (329) Weapons Officer (329)
Missile Officer (329)
°fflcer (33())
Chief (3areer Counselor (303.4) C0niMaster-at-Arms (303.3)
Cro "and Master Chief (303.13) Work <fUpervis°rs (Fig. 3-2)
SseuPervisors (356)
Main p 0ntrol Assistant (320.1) r°Pulsion Assistant (320.3)
Th,
lese Professionals
report to authorities outside of any division for one or more functions also assigned as principal duties for every division officer.
corresponding units in other conditions of rea ,
► Conditions of readiness would be simplified aces ^ tured to cope with battle or emergency circum port, as well as at sea. , Hat'
The Support Organization in combination Wjl j,attle
tie Control Organization would comprise the s 'P readiness organization.
• J Account On the Matters of Duality, Authority, anctf,n ,ny P£tl
ity: Two important questions may now arise. Wj .fl pie be confused by having to respond to superl ^0pty ^ chains instead of one? And in each chain, will au sufficient to match responsibility? . efi tfief^
First, there will be two chains. But remem ^ have been two chains for years; in fact, more t a different chain for M&A as well as for reading.q|1 pu every section of every battle-alert readiness con
cisely clarifying relationships between division officers, departmental assistants, and collateral duty assignments. With these matters attended to, the current basic SORM should be adequate to “maintain hull and equipment in designed condition.” It will not, however, adequately support organizational objectives of operating with designed proficiency in all readiness conditions, maintaining physical and psychological stamina, and responding to an attempted surprise attack.
The Existing SORM’s Organization for Battle Control and Battle Training: The crew members of a modem warship no longer man operating stations mainly by divisions or “work centers.” Most man o’warmen fight or stand watch in roughly structured teams, such as repair parties, combat systems subgroups, ammunition handlers, and bridge personnel. Many of these teams in Condition I, and many more in Conditions II, III, IV, and V, are made up of personnel from mixtures of divisions and departments. Today, a clearcut chain of responsibility for expert performance of battle and watch teams exists only when people happen to be oh their battle or battle-alert watchstations, which may occur rarely.6
It has become impractical for a department head or division officer to monitor—much less supervise—the level of battle training of Seaman Smith, who happens to be assigned battle or watch stations outside of his department or division. The old SORM does make an attempt to relieve the department head or division officer of such responsibility (811), but the attempt fails to deal firmly with the problems faced by the various department heads who are in charge of all the stations to which Seaman Smith may have been assigned. The problem is that Seaman Smith’s personal battle readiness includes his operational skills at every one of those stations, his physical stamina, his psychological stamina, and his readiness to respond instantly to sudden demand. All of these comprise the essentials of battle training, and all of these involve many more qualities and skills than one can acquire through occasional periods on station only.
The emergent major issue that my new organization must resolve boils down to how to establish a clear chain of authority and responsibility for battle training.
Proposed Organization for Battle Control and Battle Training: I now have in mind that my ship’s primary chain of responsibility for battle training should be the same as the primary structure for command and control in battle— the system of assignments to stations at Condition I or at-sea General Quarters. I further propose that my Condition I hierarchy be extended to include all levels of leadership on board in the following order:
- Commanding officer
- Executive officer
- Battle control officers
- Leaders of combat teams
- Leaders of watch teams
- Members of combat and watch teams
The leaders in this battle control hierarchy are to be assigned major responsibilities which will continue in
force regardless of whether personnel are on station station. In general, I charge each leader to: jjneSs
- Monitor, evaluate, and report upon the battle re
of personnel, equipment, and structure under his - zance in all conditions of readiness . • „to
- Plan for and supervise operational and battle trai f make full and best use of time made available y
authority in mind
The levels of authority and responsibility I have Qf are precisely worded in Table 2. Note the elimma two old conditions of readiness (IV and V) forsirnajiel- and clarity, and the designation of two new on®f P„ t0 fit ing underway conditions but bearing the prefix nCy circumstances when battle or other violent emofCOui- threatens a ship in port. I reaffirm that the chain ^ 0f mand and control in Condition I, down to the 0. combat team leaders, is to bear explicit continuing ^Q{te. sibility and authority for monitoring the readiness o sponding stations in Conditions IP-I, II. an^ nient of The ship’s combat teams—the principal new e1eg ti- my proposed battle control organization—-cou gonar.
ties such as Combat Information Center (Surface)- 0[1g Electronic Warfare, and Forward Engine Room, others.7
Summary of the Proposed Overall Organ'20|^ratiofl Battle Readiness: The old maintenance and admin ^.ollid organization, based on departments and divisions, ^ c0l). rename the Support Organization. It would remain ^gJ]a ventionally structured except that the relationship^ aSSjS- responsibilities of division officers, departmen^^.^. tants, and collateral duty assignments would My division officers would no longer bear unm onne' responsibilities for battle training of division P assigned to “mixed” combat and watch team®- ernble My new Battle Control Organization worn eVj0osly the current watch organization except that, as P
noted: fo0nal ele'
- Combat and watch teams would become 1 ments of organization headed by team leaders-
- The Condition I chain of command would ho o0jtorioS ing off-station responsibilities for training and ^ ^ as the overall battle readiness of their own units a^neSs.
Table 2 A Ship’s Battle Control Organization
®att*e Readiness. Full battle readiness is Und ^ to perform all designed operations
anH,r conditions of severe stress, extreme violence, nd/or attempted surprise.
2
"'hi Contr°l Organization. The manner in com f is organizationally structured to exercise ^rganiz'H ^at^e *<nown 35 the Battle Control
Condition* of Readiness. The Battle Control ditio 1Zation shall be designed to function under conns readiness to meet circumstances as follows: Condition I :
Condition II:
Condition III:
The
then
Battle action imminent Battle action possible Battle action unlikely
Will ?r?rtx before each of the above designators In p^'icate the corresponding readiness condition
(Note: The terms Condition IV and Condition V are
Continued.)
z^els of Authority. The Battle Control Organi- ^thority13^ 'ncorporate the following levels of
Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Battle Control Officers
headers of Combat Teams
Leaders of Watch Teams
Members of Combat and >Xhtch Teams
Tiay?altle Systems- The Battle Control Organization Corporate Battle Systems as follows:
A Ship Control System A Combat Information System A Weapons System A Communications System An Engineering System A Damage Control System
ereis>att*C Control Officers. An individual who ex- U, 0r ,SpControl of a Battle System in Condition I, IP-1, C°nc,it.-n's termed a Battle Control Officer (BCO). biijtj f>n 1 ECOs also exercise continuing responsi- rea(ji S 0r achievement and maintenance of full battle ess 35 described in Paragraph 8 below.
ne>ther conflict nor overlap. My Support technicai t'°n bear responsibility for doing work and T°nitorj ra’n'n8> and my Battle Control Organization for °r (he f-1^ readiness and conducting battle training. And SeCorArS| t'me, each chain will be clearly defined. e>tercise ’ eaders *n each chain will have full authority to ^er'Ock ,J'°ntr°i °f shipboard activities within the time ' located by command.
- Combat and \Khtch Teams.
- A group of two or more persons who man assigned stations in close proximity in Condition I shall be known as a Combat Team. A group of two or more persons who man assigned stations in close proximity in any section of a Readiness Condition other than Condition I shall be known as a Watch Team.
- The senior member of each Combat and Watch Team shall be designated as a Team Leader.
- Each Combat and Watch Team shall be assigned a formal title within the ship’s organization. Every member of the ship’s company below the level of Battle Control Officer should be assigned as a member of a Condition I Combat Team.
- The ship’s Watch, Quarter, and Station Bill shall be so structured and displayed as to enable ready identification of each Combat and Watch Team by title and of the members and leaders together by name.
- Continuing Responsibilities. On-station and off-station responsibilities of each Battle Control Officer and Combat Team Leader, under the direction of Condition I Battle Control Officers, shall be as assigned by the Commanding Officer and should typically include the following:
- Exercising control on station;
- Defining and documenting the capabilities comprising the full battle readiness of his element of organization;
- Maintaining close familiarity with the condition and adequacy of assigned battle and watch station equipment and structure;
- Maintaining close familiarity with the physical, mental, and operational capabilities of personnel assigned as members of (1) respective Combat Teams and of (2) Watch Teams with corresponding stations;
- Making full and best use of available training time;
- Keeping higher authority fully and accurately informed of the capabilities of his element of organization in relation to the capabilities comprising full battle readiness;
- Exercising leadership to strengthen the states of training, cohesion, and stamina of his element of organization;
- Initiating actions or recommendations to maintain full battle readiness.
Third, leaders in the battle control chain will have new authority commensurate with their responsibilities for monitoring and improving readiness to fight. For example, I shall want my combat team leaders to participate in performance evaluations and recommendations for advancements and reenlistments, to have a say regarding recommendations on special requests and standbys for leave and liberty, to appear for their team members at captain’s mast, to accompany formal material inspections of their battle equipments and areas, to present their teams occasionally for the captain’s personnel inspections in battle dress, to take charge of general military training and most Personnel Qualification Standards, and to keep their teams intact for organized athletics.
Advantages of the New Organization: My proposed Battle Readiness Organization will offer these advantages:
- Improved material condition (as a result of assigning finite responsibilities to operators for monitoring equipment and structure that they man in battle and on which their lives may depend)
- Manageable responsibilities for division officers (no longer to include battle training for stations outside of their divisions)
- Decentralized responsibilities for on-the-spot leadership during battle conditions
- Improved planning of on-board instruction and battle
drills (now a continuing responsibility of the batt e c chain of command) f se-
- Practical procedures for conducting battle an s ^
lected teams without the necessity for calling my ^ ship’s company to stations (since explicit teams c called away by title) . fjgtit
- Strengthened cohesion among the personnel w
together . . . ..j-signed
- Simplification of the task of defining the .^gad- capabilities” that underlie the definition of full bac0[11. iness (made possible by identification of the discr
bat team to which each set of capabilities app ie®^s and
- A realistic potential for setting team training ^ in providing continuous feedback on progress ac ^ [,y order to help motivate personnel (also made P°^T1jSSions the identification of combat teams with discrete t
and memberships) 0f pet'
- More effective countering of the adverse effec sjjig sonnel turnover upon battle readiness (because ^
More effective combat training would be possible if the ship’s primary chain of responsibility for battle training were the same as the primary structure for command and control in battle—the system of assignments to stations for at-sea General Quarters.
on team training enables experienced members the deficiencies of new members until the latter
duf'
trained)
► A practical procedure for organizing pa ing liberty hours in port—in order to preassign ^ bilities on the part of all hands on board f°r ^nCj eXtef damage investigation, damage control, interna nal security, command and control, external c0e(\d^
shifting ® 1*
j.g\VS
resp1
artial c^'-
• • jndep1
tions (including media liaison), shifting to ^ power, and manning weapons (functions that ‘
lJo'1
:s t . s true our ships have trouble keeping them- iti shipsa*ned t0 Tight. But creating some new type of unit
selves t__
needed^c. for§anizations won’t change a thing. What’s
need t0' S .'Ps companies be able to sustain the skills they Oliver .^'fhstend massive violence and still continue to What Clr des‘gned firepower.
Sehous C°U*d a new SORM do to help forestall this most f‘ghtin„ Potent'al deficiency on the part of the first-line Ifba,t,ce of the United States?
3s Plater'C| tra'n'n8 is as important to full battle readiness ng den,.'*1 COn<dition (and it surely is), if good battle train- ^exPert t >.S exPert team training (and it surely does), and ty op theCam tra'nmg calls for a firm sense of responsibil- Part of team leaders, for clear definition of team
uJS'8ned f°r rapid accomplishment without dependence The tam'baSed organization)
ganized'^6 V^°m Pract'ce °f depending mainly on preor- on-b0„ , %ing squads” and assembling the rest of the Protect CrCW ^or fndhor assignment” is inadequate to vi0|esh‘P in port against accidental or deliberate ► A sof'dSUCb aS an assault by a Soviet Spetsnaz unit, “rapid ■ or8anizational foundation on which to conduct iaiminelndependent refresher training” in the event of sistan^ nt °r sudden hostilities when external training as- tance may be out of reach
'Varfare^,,J^ ^ ^aPPen: The reaction of some surface somP,u- Profess>onals to the foregoing ideas has been -Su ng l|ke the following:
>i. re’ it’s true mir chine h
v'UcQ j o f O O
taught ” °r PeoPle to train the way they’ve already been
n°t sucS°me s°hering facts have not changed. Ships are taught .C,eed*n8 in training “the way they’ve already been feans r Commanding officers still have no practical trainino° ^eePing track of the results of on-board team Qualifj ’ n°r do their leaders or sailors. The Personnel Criterja f 10n Standards training system fails to address days are0j" team training for battle. Thousands of ship- UnderCQ ..e!n§ committed to training ships to operate °f “int„n 'h°ns °f stress, damage, and surprise by means farely ^lrn refresher training availabilities that would resuitsc pract'cahle in emergencies, whereas the same ships p^°u*d he obtained—and must be obtainable—by rvill oUr°Per^ organized to train themselves. Only then goals, and for maximum cohesion within every combination of fighting teams (and all three are indispensable) then let us build into our SORM a standard ship’s organization that can help shipboard leaders make these conditions come alive.
'The central conclusions presented by this article are based on correspondence with personnel from about 125 ships, on-board discussions in 15 ships, interviews with more than 50 fleet instructors, and visits or correspondence with more than 200 other commanders, staffs, and professionals afloat and ashore, mainly during 198385. With respect to conclusions derived from professional writings and from reports of theoretical research, copies of a separate bibliography addressing team development, primary group cohesion, naval team training, measurement of performance and progress, effects of goal setting and feedback on motivation, impacts of stress upon performance, systems approach to organizational design, and resistance to change are available on request to the author by writing to the Naval Institute. -See Ernest J. King, “oome Ideas About Organization On Board Ship,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings (March 1909) 1-35 (Naval Institute Prize Essay). This failure to define full battle readiness vitiates many current guides to U. S. naval philosophy. Naval Institute texts such as The Bluejackets' Manual, Fundamentals of Naval Leadership, To Get the Job Done, the Division Officer’s Guide, and Ship Organization and Personnel rarely mention circumstances or situations likely to be encountered in combat. Many of today’s U. S. Navy professionals simply do not think in terms of “ability to fight.”
4In 1961—62, a similar shipboard management development program was conducted by a type commander in a newly recommissioned destroyer. One experiment within this program examined the feasibility and utility of composing divisions according to battle station assignments. A related experiment produced the current Planned Maintenance- (3-M) System.
’After sketching this “training organization,” the current SORM goes into intricate detail (Articles 820-831) to prescribe a conglomeration of administrative training plans, schedules, records, and reports that has certainly never been methodically evaluated for utility or feasibility.
6Major commanders may find it instructive to review sample deck logs in order to observe how rarely ships are currently able to assemble Condition I and III teams for battle drills under various employment conditions. Some damage control teams were understood to have drilled only once or twice during an entire deployment. Even if a damage control team were able to drill under way 50 times a year during normal operations, it could still practice any one team skill—say, firefighting— only about four hours during that year (assuming there are perhaps 12 designed team skills). The frequency would be much less in amphibious assault and underway replenishment units, in which damage control team personnel man nondamage control stations during high-threat operations.
’Additional examples of team titles were received from 26 ships.
Captain Appleton is a graduate of the Naval Academy, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Naval War College. Fie holds a master’s degree in information systems management and a doctorate in administrative management from the University of California. Fie has served in battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious force ships and has held four sea commands. Captain Appleton was the winner of the Education and Training Minicontest with his article, “Shipboard Training: The Team’s the Thing,” published in October 1983, and of the 1985 Arleigh Burke Essay Contest with his article, “Endgame,” published in April 1985.
Just a Little Mistake
My uncle who served in a supply ship during World War II recalls the time his ship pulled into a small lagoon in the South Pacific. There was a ship some distance away that flashed signals to them.
“What did they say?” inquired the captain.
“They said that this is a F.I.N.E...A.R.E.A.”
The captain shrugged, “That’s a strange message. Who sent it, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce?”
As they came closer to the other ship, another message was flashed.
The embarrassed signalman told the captain, “I’m afraid I made a mistake . . . that was an M instead of an F. ”
“A mine area!”
“Yes, sir. And there is more. They said we should get the H.E.L.L. out of here!”
Tom R. Kovach